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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DAMON and MISTY COMER, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No. 20010323-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant Misty Comer appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1996). Defendant Damon Comer appeals from a plea in abeyance, and therefore, 
this Court has no jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Does this Court have jurisdiction to consider defendant Damon Comer's appeal 
where he entered into a plea in abeyance and no final judgment of conviction was entered? 
Standard of Review. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. See Pledger v. Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^  16, 982 
P.2d 572. 
1 
2. Did exigent circumstances exist justifying the officers' warrantless entry into the 
home of defendants? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court reviews for clear error a trial court's 
underlying factual findings on a motion to suppress. Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT 
App 12,18,994 P.2d 1283; State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1232 (Utah 1996). However, 
a trial court's determination that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry is 
reviewed for correctness. City ofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah App. 1994); 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, at f 8. 
3. Did the trial court commit reversible error in refusing to view at the suppression 
hearing a video tape of the preliminary hearing, the transcript of which was not included in 
the record on appeal? 
Standard of Review. The appellate court cannot review a question which depends 
upon alleged facts not included in the record. See State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 
(Utah App. 1998). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is relevant to a 
determination of this case. That amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have 
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the 
Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
2 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The defendants, Damon and Misty Comer, were charged by information with 
possession of a controlled substance in a drug-free zone, a second degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2000), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). M.C. 1-2; D.C. 1-2. After 
a preliminary hearing, defendants were bound over on both counts. M.C. 19-20; D.C. 21 -22. 
Defendants filed a motion to suppress the evidence, but following an evidentiary hearing, the 
court denied the motion. M.C. 49-52, 83-84; D.C. 56, 88-89. 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the State dismissed the misdemeanor count against 
defendant Misty Comer and she entered a guilty plea to the felony charge, reserving her right 
to appeal the court's adverse ruling on the motion to suppress. M.C. 101-03, 106-08. The 
court sentenced her to a prison term of one-to-fifteen years, but suspended that sentence and 
placed her under supervised probation for 36 months. M.C. 101-03, 106-08. She timely 
appealed. M.C. 104. 
Defendant Damon Comer entered into a plea in abeyance on the felony count and the 
State dismissed the misdemeanor charge. D.C. 99-104, 109-11; see also M.C. 98-99, 103. 
He filed a notice of appeal one day later. D.C. 112-13. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
On July 5, 2000, Officer Derek Dickey and two other officers of the Brigham City 
Police Department were dispatched to the home of defendants Damon and Misty Comer on 
a reported "family fight in progress." M.C. 126: 4, 16, 18, 22, 25.l Once all three officers 
arrived at the scene, they knocked on the door of the residence. M.C. 126: 4, 22. Misty 
Comer answered, first opening the door less than a foot, and then stepping out onto the 
porch. M.C. 126:4-5,13-15,22. The manner in which Misty opened the door appeared odd 
to Officer Dickey, leading him to believe she was trying to prevent the officers from looking 
inside. M.C. 126:7. Officer Dickey explained that they were there to investigate a reported 
family fight and asked if anyone else was inside the home. M.C. 126: 5,22. Misty told the 
officers that her husband was inside and "immediately turned and walked back inside the 
residence," shutting the door behind her. M.C. 50, 61; R. 126: 5, 7-8,22-23, 27. 
When Misty Comer walked back into the residence, Officer Dickey did not know what 
Misty was doing, whether a weapon was involved, whether others were in the house, or what 
condition Misty's husband might be in. M.C. 126: 6, 8,28. Thus, to ensure their safety and 
the safety of others, the officers followed Misty into the house and down a hallway to a back 
bedroom. M.C. 126: 6, 8-10, 15, 21-23, 27. Misty stuck her head inside the bedroom 
doorway, and after notifying her husband that police were there, Damon Comer emerged 
from the bedroom, closing the door behind him. M.C. 126: 6. The officers then followed 
!The report of a family fight was called in from a residence less than two blocks 
away. See M.C. 126: 19. 
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the Comers back into the front room where they discussed the fight. M.C. 126: 6,23. The 
Comers acknowledged that they had had an argument and Misty admitted to scratching 
Damon. M.C. 126: 6. Damon had fairly extensive scratches to his chest, neck, and back. 
M.C. 126:6,23. 
After verifying the assault on Damon, officers determined to arrest Misty for domestic 
violence assault. M.C. 126: 7,13. In the course of making that arrest, the officers found the 
drugs which formed the basis of the possession charge in this case. M.C. 126: 7.2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Lack of Jurisdiction. Defendant Damon Comer entered into a plea in abeyance 
agreement. Accordingly, no final judgment was entered and this Court is without jurisdiction 
to hear his appeal. In any event, he did not reserve the right to appeal. 
Emergency Aid Doctrine. The officers were dispatched to a "family fight in 
progress" reported by a known, nearby resident. When the officers knocked on the door to 
investigate the report, defendant Misty Comer's behavior did nothing to dispel the officers' 
suspicions. She opened the door and stepped outside as if she was trying to conceal 
something inside. When officers asked if her husband was home, she abruptly retreated 
inside, shutting the door behind her. Under these circumstances, and given the volatile nature 
2The details of Misty Comer's arrest and the discovery of the controlled substance 
were not elicited at the suppression hearing. Those details, which are not relevant to a 
determination of the issue on appeal, were apparently elicited at the preliminary hearing. 
See M.C. 126: 49-52. However, defendant did not include the transcript of the 
preliminary hearing in the record on appeal. 
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of domestic violence calls, the officers were justified in following her into the home under 
the emergency aid doctrine of the exigent circumstances exception. 
Video Tape of Preliminary Hearing. Defendant claims that the trial court should 
have viewed the video tape of the preliminary hearing at the suppression hearing because an 
officer allegedly deviated from his testimony. However, defendant has not identified the 
inconsistent statements, nor has he included in the record a transcript of the preliminary 




THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION TO HEAR DEFENDANT DAMON 
COMER'S APPEAL 
Defendant Damon Comer, like his wife and co-defendant Misty Comer, challenges 
the trial court's order denying their motion to suppress and the trial court's refusal to view 
a video tape of the preliminary hearing at the suppression hearing. See Aplt. Brf. at 5-11. 
However, unlike his wife, defendant Damon Comer entered a plea in abeyance agreement. 
D.C. 99-104,109-11. The law is well settled that a direct appeal cannot be taken from a plea 
in abeyance because there is no final judgment. In State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415, 416 
(Utah App. 1997) (per curiam), this Court held: 
In criminal cases, the sentence itself is the final judgment from which an 
appeal can be taken. Because defendant has not been sentenced, the appeal 
was not taken from a final order, and this court lacks jurisdiction to consider 
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the appeal. Further, this court recently stated that the plain language of section 
77-2a-l "reveals that a plea in abeyance is not a final adjudication." 
(quoting State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021,1025 n. 7 (Utah App. 1996)) (other citations omitted). 
Accordingly, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider defendant Damon Comer's appeal 
and should dismiss the same. 
Even if this Court had jurisdiction, it should not consider defendant Damon Comer's 
claims because he did not preserve his right to appeal as required under State v. Sery, 758 
P.2d 935, 938 (Utah App. 1988) and rule 1 l(i), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. As a 
general rule, "a voluntary guilty plea is a waiver of the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional 
issues, including alleged pre-plea constitutional violations." Sery, 758 P.2d at 937-38; 
accord State v. Munson, 972 P.2d 418, 421 (Utah 1998). An appeal may be taken from a 
guilty plea only if "the plea entered by the defendant with the consent of the prosecution and 
accepted by the trial judge specifically preserves the suppression issue for appeal and allows 
withdrawal of the plea if defendant's arguments in favor of suppression are accepted by the 
appellate court." Id. at 938; accord Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i).3 This defendant did not do. See 
D.C. 99-104,109-11. Defendant thus waived his right to appeal the suppression issue in any 
event. 
3Rule 1 l(i) provides: "With approval of the court and the consent of the 
prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or 
no contest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of 
the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defendant who prevails on 
appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea." 
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II. 
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFIED THE OFFICERS' 
WARRANTLESS ENTRY INTO DEFENDANT'S HOME 
Defendant Misty Comer contends that the officers' warrantless entry into her home 
violated her Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Aplt. Brf. 
at 6.4 Specifically, she argues that nothing suggested to the officers that an emergency 
existed which would justify their warrantless entry. Aplt. Brf. at 9-10. Contrary to 
defendant's claim, the trial court properly found that the officers' entry was reasonable. 
A. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PROTECTION AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES 
AND SEIZURES. 
1. A Preference for Warrants. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and [that] no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause . . . ." U.S. Const, amend. IV. The United States Supreme Court has 
observed that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the 
4Although defendant claims that the warrantless entry into the residence also 
violated her right against unreasonable searches and seizures under article I, section 14 of 
the Utah Constitution, she engages in no independent analysis for that proposition. See 
Aplt. Brf. at 6-11. Accordingly, the State's analysis is limited to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. See State v. Jarman, 1999 UT App 269,14 n.l, 987 P.2d 1284. 
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Fourth Amendment is directed." United States v. United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297,313,92 S.Ct. 2125,2134 (1972).5 
The Fourth Amendment adopts a "strong preference for searches conducted pursuant 
to a warrant." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). Thus, 
"searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable." 
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,586,100 S.Ct. 1371,1380 (1980); accord Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347,357, 88 S.Ct. 507,514 (1967); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443,477-78,91 S.Ct. 2022,2044 (1971); CityofOrem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1387 (Utah 
App. 1994). However, "[p]olice entry into a house without a warrant is not [ ] always 
unreasonable." Murdock v. Stout, 54 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995). 
2. Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement. 
"The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment [remains] reasonableness." Florida v. 
Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 1803 (1991). The Supreme Court has thus 
acknowledged that there are some circumstances "where the public interest is such that 
neither a warrant nor probable cause is required." Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325,331,110 
S.Ct. 1093, 1097 (1990). "When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished 
expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the like, the [Supreme] Court has found that 
certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure 
reasonable." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 949 (2001). 
5The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures 
by the federal government applies to state officers by virtue of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,213, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1442 (1960). 
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"[A] few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions" to the warrant 
requirement have emerged. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. at 514; see, e.g., Zap v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 624, 66 S.Ct. 1277 (1943) (consent); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 
1868 (1968) (stop and frisk); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48,51-52,72 S.Ct. 93,95-96 
(1951) (exigent circumstances); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034 (1969) 
(search incident to arrest); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864 
(1982) (automobile search); State v. Romero, 660 P.2d 715,717-18 (Utah 1983) (plain view). 
These are "flexible, common-sense exceptions," rooted in the Amendment's "central 
requirement of reasonableness." Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,735-36,739,103 S.Ct. 1535, 
1540,1542 (1983). 
3. The Exigent Circumstances Exception. 
One such exception to the warrant requirement is the exigent circumstances exception. 
New York v. Quarks, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 2630 n.3 (1984). Under this 
exception, a warrant is not required if the circumstances "involve[ ] a plausible claim of 
specially pressing or urgent law enforcement need, i.e., 'exigent circumstances.'" McArthur, 
121 S.Ct. at 950. In these circumstances, '"the exigencies of the situation' make the need of 
law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable." 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414 (1978) (quoting McDonald 
v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,456, 69 S.Ct. 191,193 (1948)). 
This Court has defined "[e]xigent circumstances [as] those '"that would cause a 
reasonable person to believe that entry . . . was necessary to prevent physical harm to the 
10 
officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or 
some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts.'" State 
v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9,18 (Utah App. 1993) {quoting United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 
1195, 1199 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101 (1984)); accord State v. 
Wells, 928 P.2d 386,389 (Utah App. 1996), ajf'd, 939 P.2d 1204 (Utah 1997) (holding that 
the court of appeals' "analysis of the motion to suppress is correct"). 
In assessing exigent circumstances, courts employ a balancing test "rather than [ ] a 
per se rule of unreasonableness." McArthur, 121 S.Ct. at 950. The Court "balance[s] the 
privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was 
reasonable." Id; cf. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,703,103 S.Ct. 2637,2642 (1983) 
(holding that the reasonableness of a search is determined by "balancing] the nature and 
quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the 
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion"). "'While "exigent 
circumstances" have multiple characteristics, the guiding principle is reasonableness, and 
each case must be examined in the light of facts known to officers at the time they acted.'" 
Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1391 {quoting State v. Hert, 220 Neb. 447, 370 N.W.2d 166,170 (Neb. 
1985)); see also Henrie, 868 P.2d at 1388 (holding that "[t]he determination of exigency is 
based on the totality of the circumstances"). 
The courts have identified a number of variant situations that fall within the exigent 
circumstances exception, including the "emergency aid" doctrine. See Salt Lake City v. 
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Davidson, 2000 UT 12, ffif 10-13, 27,994 P.2d 1283.6 Under the emergency aid doctrine, a 
warrantless search is justified if the following requirements are met: 
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an 
emergency exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance 
for the protection of life. 
(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize 
evidence. 
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the 
area or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area 
to be searched and the emergency. 
Id. at f 12 (Greenwood, J., lead opinion) {quoting State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 550 (Utah 
App. 1997) (Greenwood, J., concurring in result)), f 27 (Wilkins, J., dissenting, but adopting 
the three-prong test).7 The emergency aid doctrine "validates and encourages law 
6For example, the "hot pursuit'* doctrine is a variant of the exigent circumstances 
exception, authorizing the warrantless entry into the home of a fleeing suspect for whom 
police have probable cause that he committed a serious crime. See State v. Ramirez, 814 
P.2d 1131, 1133-35 (Utah App. 1991); see also Beavers, 859 P.2d at 14. Another variant 
is the "community caretaker" doctrine, authorizing a warrantless search or seizure if it is 
"in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function" and "the circumstances 
demonstrate an imminent danger to life or limb." Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 
364 (Utah App. 1992), aff'd, 875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994) (affirming "for the reasons stated 
by the court of appeals"). 
7In his dissenting opinion, Judge Wilkins stated that he "would adhere to the 
emergency aid doctrine [and] adopt the three-prong test" set forth by Judge 
Greenwood in her lead opinion. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 27 (Wilkins, J., 
dissenting). However, in applying that test, Judge Wilkins, unlike Judge Greenwood, 
concluded that the officer was justified in searching the defendant for drugs in the hopes 
of assisting defendant's apparent associate who lie unconscious on the floor. Id. at 23. 
Judge Bench concurred in the result, but indicated that he would limit the doctrine "to its 
intended and accepted scope, i.e., a search of the individual with the medical need." 
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, % 17 (Bench, J., concurring in the result). 
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enforcement personnel to engage in activities that promote the safety and well-being of the 
citizens and also includes reasonable restrictions to avoid abuses." Id. at f 13. 
B. ANALYSIS: THE WARRANTLESS ENTRY WAS JUSTIFIED UNDER THE EXIGENCIES 
OF THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CALL. 
In the circumstances of the case here, the officers were justified in entering 
defendants' home without a warrant. The entry here met all three requirements set forth in 
Davidson for a warrantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine and was otherwise 
reasonable given the State's strong interest in preventing domestic violence. 
1. Emergency Circumstances: Domestic Violence. 
The officers had "an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency 
exist[ed]" and that there was "an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of 
life." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, at f 12. The officers were dispatched to a reported 
"family fight in progress." M.C. 126: 4, 16, 18, 22, 25. Misty Comer's response to the 
officers at the scene did not defuse the situation, but only heightened the officers' suspicions 
and concerns. She opened the door no more than 12 inches, as if she were trying to conceal 
something from the officers, and then apparently slipped outside onto the porch. M.C. 126: 
4-5,7,13-15,22. The officers advised her of the family fight report and asked if anyone else 
was inside. M.C. 126: 5, 22, 27. Misty told them that her husband was inside, but then 
"made a somewhat sudden and unexplained retreat into the house," shutting the door behind 
her. M.C. 126: 5, 7-8, 22-23, 27, 39-40.8 Under these circumstances, the officers were 
8It is not evident from the transcript of the suppression hearing that Misty shut the 
door when she went back inside. However, the prosecution accepted the statement of 
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justified in believing that an emergency existed calling for their immediate entry into the 
home to protect possible victims. 
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that "[t]he [domestic violence] call itself creates 
a sufficient indication that an exigency exists allowing the officer to enter a dwelling if no 
circumstance indicates that entry is unnecessary." State v. Greene, 784 P.2d 257,259 (Ariz. 
1989). Other jurisdictions have also recognized the domestic violence situation as an 
exigency justifying a warrantless entry under the emergency aid doctrine. State v. Gilbert, 
942 P.2d 660,664 (Kan. App. 1997) (citingPeople v. Thompson, 770 P.2d 1282,1285 (Colo. 
1989);and State v. Menz, 880 P.2d 48 (Wash. App. 1994), review denied, 890 P.2d 463 
(Wash. 1995)). The Arizona high court explained: 
These calls commonly involve dangerous situations in which the possibility for 
physical harm or damage escalates rapidly. The immediate presence of the 
officer is essential. To require an officer to obtain a search warrant before 
entering a dwelling in response to a domestic violence call would be a 
meaningless delay that could lead to the occurrence of otherwise preventable 
violence. 
Greene, 784 P.2d at 259. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court likewise observed "that 
situations involving the potential for imminent physical harm in the domestic context 
implicate exigencies that may justify limited police intrusion into a dwelling in order to 
remove an item of potential danger." Commonwealth v. Wright, 560 Pa. 34, 40, 742 A.2d 
661, 664 (Penn. 1999). 
facts as posed by defendant in her motion to suppress which indicated that she shut the 
door behind her. See M.C. 50, 61. 
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The circumstances facing the officers here did not signal that entry was unnecessary. 
See Greene, 784 P.2d at 259 (holding that warrantless entry is justified unless "circumstance 
indicates that entry is unnecessary"). Although Misty Comer did not appear hurt, her 
suspicious behavior only corroborated the call from a reliable citizen-informant that 
something was amiss. Thus, entry into the home was reasonable. 
Defendant contends that "the nature of the call should not even be taken into account," 
reasoning that "anyone could make a call about anything." Aplt. Brf. at 9-10. The report, 
however, came from a nearby resident who lived less than two blocks away. See M.C. 126: 
19. The resident also provided her name. M.C. 126: 19. Thus, contrary to defendant's 
claim, the reliability of the call was high. This Court "assume[s] veracity when a citizen-
informant provides information as a victim or witness of crime." Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 
943 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah App. 1997), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998); accord State 
v. Harris, 671 P.2d 175,180 (Utah 1983). "This is because citizen informers, unlike police 
informers, volunteer information out of concern for the community and not for personal 
benefit." State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990). Moreover, "[a] tip from a 
citizen informant who gives his or her name is highly reliable because the police may verify 
the information and it subjects the informant to penalty if the information is false." City of 
St George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165,169 (Utah App. 1997), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 
1998). Thus, an officer responding to a D.U.I, report from a citizen is "encouraged to 
investigate the suspect immediately, rather than to allow the suspect to drive so that the 
officer may observe the driving." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (internal quotes omitted). 
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Likewise, an officer responding to a domestic violence report should investigate the situation 
immediately, rather than wait to observe the perpetrator resume his or her assault. 
Defendant also argues that the "mere possibility" of an emergency does not justify a 
warrantless entry. Aplt. Brf. at 11. She explains that the officers' entry may have been 
justified had the report indicated someone was injured or that gunshots had been fired. Aplt. 
Brf. at 10. Absent this, defendant contends, nothing suggests an emergency situation. Aplt. 
Brf. at 10. 
Defendant minimizes the exigency of the situation, ignoring the realities faced by the 
officers at the time. "Whether a police officer's acts in the face of a perceived emergency 
were objectively reasonable is a matter to be evaluated in relation to the scene as it 
reasonably appeared to the officer at the time, 'not as it may seem to a scholar after the event 
with the benefit of leisured retrospective analysis.'" State v. Lynd, 111 P.2d 770,773 (Wash. 
App. 1989) {quoting Commonwealth v. Young, 416 N.E.2d 944, 950 (Mass. 1981) (other 
citations omitted)). The law does not require such extreme exigencies before officers may 
make a warrantless entry. As observed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals, "[ejvidence of 
extreme danger in the form of shots fired, screaming, or blood is not required for there to be 
some reason to believe that a safety risk exists." Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 
49 (1st Cir. 1999). The First Circuit explained: 
On the spot reasonable judgments by officers about risks and dangers are 
protected. Deference to those judgments may be particularly warranted in 
domestic disputes. In those disputes, violence may be lurking and explode 
with little warning. Domestic violence victims may be intimidated or suffer 
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from a dependence inherent in the abusive relationship. The signs of danger 
may be masked. 
Id. at 50. Given the reliable citizen report and defendant's suspicious behavior, the officers' 
decision to follow defendant into the house was reasonable. 
2. Motivation for Entry: Protection of Life. 
The emergency aid doctrine next requires that the entry "not [be] primarily motivated 
by intent to arrest and seize evidence." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, at ^ 12. That 
requirement is also met here. The officers testified that they followed defendant into her 
home to verify that no one was hurt and to ensure the safety of any of those involved in the 
fight, as well as their own safety. M.C. 126: 6-8, 21, 23. The officers, therefore, did not 
enter the home to look for evidence or even make an arrest. See Gilbert, 942 P.2d at 665 
(noting that "nothing in the record [of another case] indicated that the police officers entered 
the house for any reasons other than to render assistance and to search for additional 
victims"); Stout, 54 F.3d at 1440 (observing that "[a]bsent any evidence of pretext, [the court 
is] more inclined to give deference to the judgments of police officers doing their job in the 
field"). Their entry was limited to ensure the safety of those involved. "Officers' decisions 
to enter a home to ensure the safety of those believed to be at risk of domestic violence have 
been found reasonable by other courts" and the officers' decision here should also be found 
to be reasonable. Fletcher, 196 F.3d at 51. 
Indeed, the officers' actions were consistent with their statutorily mandated duty under 
the Cohabitant Abuse Procedures Act (CAPA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-36-1 to -10 (1999). 
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CAP A "stands for the proposition that because domestic violence is serious in nature and has 
a high likelihood of repeated violence, incidents of domestic abuse require the mandatory and 
immediate action of law enforcement." State v. Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 54 (Utah App. 1996) 
(interpreting the Act's predecessor). Under CAPA, "[t]he primary duty of law enforcement 
officers responding to a domestic violence call is to protect the victim and enforce the law." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.2 (1999). CAPA requires officers "who respond[ ] to an 
allegation of domestic violence [to] use all reasonable means to protect the victim and 
prevent further violence, including . . . taking the action that, in the officer's discretion, is 
reasonably necessary to provide for the safety of the victim and any family or household 
member[,]... [and] arranging], facilitating], or providing] for the victim and any child to 
obtain medical treatment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.1(1) (1999).9 Failure of the officers 
to immediately act as they did would have been a dereliction of their duty.10 
3. Connection with the Area to Be Searched: Site of Domestic Violence. 
The final requirement of the emergency aid doctrine is that "there must be a 
connection with the area to be searched and the emergency." Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 
9CAPA also provides that "[a]ll training of law enforcement officers relating to 
domestic violence shall stress protection of the victim, enforcement of criminal laws in 
domestic situations, and the availability of community shelters, services, and resources." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-36-2.3 (1999). 
l0The legislature has also adopted the Cohabitant Abuse Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 
30-6-1 to -14 (1999), "[i]n response to a growing concern, nationwide as well as in Utah, 
surrounding the recognition of domestic violence as a clear community problem." Bailey 
v. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, H 11 n.4, 18 P.3d 1129, cert, granted, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). 
That Act provides a quick and simplified procedure whereby victims of domestic violence 
can obtain protective orders. 
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at f 12. Here, the family fight was reported as occurring at the residence and defendant 
retreated into that residence under suspicious circumstances. Under these circumstances, the 
officers were justified in following defendant into the home, to assure both the safety of the 
occupants as well as their own. Although defendant Damon Comer was in his bedroom, the 
officers did not enter the bedroom, but allowed him to walk into the living room where they 
verified that he in fact had suffered injuries as the result of a domestic fight. M.C. 126: 6, 
8-10,15,21 -23,27. The officers' entry into the home was thus strictly circumscribed by the 
exigency which created its justification. As observed by the Arizona Supreme Court in 
Greene, "[o]nce the officer entered the apartment pursuant to the exigency, he could lawfully 
take steps reasonably related to the routine investigation of the offense and the identification 
of the perpetrator, which steps could have included a protective walk-through of the 
dwelling." Greene, 784 P.2d at 259 (internal quotes omitted). 
* * * 
Because all three requirements of the emergency aid doctrine have been met under the 
circumstances here, the officers' entry into defendant's home was reasonable. Application 
of the emergency aid doctrine to the domestic violence situation is consistent with the 
decisions in other courts and strikes the appropriate balance between the citizen's 
fundamental right against police intrusion and the State's compelling interest in protecting 
victims of domestic violence. See McArthur, 121 S.Ct. at 950 (determining the 
reasonableness of a search or seizure under the exigent circumstances exception by 
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"balancing] the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns").11 The incident here 
"involve[d] a plausible claim of specially pressing or law enforcement need," justifying the 
officers' warrantless entry. McArthur, 121 S.Ct. at 950. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the trial court's order denying defendant's motion to suppress. 
III. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT ANY ERROR IN REFUSING TO 
VIEW THE VIDEO TAPE OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING AT THE 
SUPPRESSION HEARING WAS HARMFUL 
Defendant also complains that the trial court refused to view the video tape of the 
preliminary hearing at the suppression hearing. Aplt. Brf. at 5-6. He argues that the 
preliminary hearing video was necessary to show that Officer Dickey's testimony at the 
preliminary hearing was inconsistent with his testimony at the suppression hearing. Aplt. 
Brf. at 5-6. However, defendant fails to identify what statements were inconsistent. This 
11
 Certainly, police "must respect basic freedoms guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment. A person's home is her sanctuary, not ordinarily to be entered by the police 
unless that entry is authorized by a warrant." Fletcher, 196 F.3d at 50 (internal citations 
and footnotes omitted). On the other hand, domestic violence is "a clear community 
problem," in Utah and nationwide. Bayles, 2001 UT App 34, at f 11 n.4. A "domestic 
violence complaint[ ] [is] one of the most potentially dangerous, volatile arrest situations 
confronting police." State v. Richards, 789 P.2d 689,691 (Utah App. 1989). 
"[D]omestic violence is cyclical and often does not end with a single occurrence or 
incident." Farrow, 919 P.2d at 54. '"[0]ngoing violence and abuse is the norm in 
domestic violence cases. Not only is there a great likelihood that any one battering 
episode is part of a larger scheme of dominance and control, that scheme usually escalates 
in frequency and severity.'" People v. Truong, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 904, 913 (Cal. App. 
2001) (quoting Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 1876 (1995-1996 
Reg. Sess.) June 25, 1996, pp. 3-4)). Moreover, "children who witness or experience 
domestic violence suffer deep and profound harms." Opinion of the Justices to the 
Senate, 691 N.E.2d911, 914 (Mass. 1998). 
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Court will not reverse a decision of the court below unless defendant can demonstrate 
prejudice. See State v. Vargas, 2001 UT 5, f 48, 20 P.3d 271 (holding that the appellate 
court will not reverse the trial court for committing harmless error). Because defendant fails 
to demonstrate how any inconsistent statements harmed him, his claim must fail. 
Moreover, defendant did not include a transcript of the preliminary hearing in the 
record on appeal. '"Absent that record, defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral 
allegation which the reviewing] court has no power to determine. [An appellate court] 
simply cannot rule on a question which depends for its existence upon alleged facts 
unsupported by the record/" State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289,293 (Utah 1982)) (brackets in original). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
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